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Abstract
This paper presents results from a randomized eld experiment to test for the impor-
tance of limited commitment (due to incomplete contract enforceability) in explaining intra-
household risk sharing arrangements in Kenya. The experiment followed 142 daily income
earners and their spouses for 8 weeks. Every week, each individual had a 50% chance of
receiving a 150 Kenyan shilling (US $2) income shock (equivalent to about 1.5 daysincome
for men and 1 weeks income for women). This paper has 2 main results. First, since the
experimental payments are random, they allow for a direct test of allocative Pareto e¢ -
ciency. I reject e¢ ciency, as male private goods expenditures are sensitive to the receipt of
the payment. Second, the experiment varied the level of intra-household correlation in the
experimental payments between couples. I nd that women send bigger transfers to their
husbands when shocks are independent or negatively correlated, a result consistent with the
presence of limited commitment. I nd no di¤erence in transfers for men, likely because the
shocks were too small to cause the limited commitment constraint to bind for them.
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I would like to thank my advisors Orley Ashenfelter, Esther Duo, Michael Kremer, and Christina Paxson for
continuous support. I thank Alicia Adsera, David Atkin, David Evans, Jane Fortson, Filippos Papakonstantinou,
Tanya Rosenblat, Laura Schechter, Ethan Yeh, seminar participants at UC Santa Cruz, the University of Houston,
University College London, the University of Pittsburgh, IFPRI and participants in the Princeton development
lunch for helpful comments, and especially Pascaline Dupas for suggestions and for assistance throughout. I am
grateful to Willa Friedman, Anthony Keats, and especially Eva Kaplan for excellent research assistance. This
project would not have been possible if not for the work of Jack Adika, Daniel Egesa, Alice Kalakate, Nduta
Kamui, Nathan Mwandije, Nashon Ngwena, Priscilla Nyamai, Seline Obwora, Isaac Ojino, Anthony Oure, Iddah
Rasanga, and Nathaniel Wamkoya in collecting and entering the data. I thank Aleke Dondo of the K-Rep
Development Agency for hosting this project in Kenya. Financial support for this project was provided by the
Princeton University Industrial Relations Section, the Center for Health and Wellbeing at Princeton University,
and the MIT Poverty Action Lab.
yDepartment of Economics, University of California, Santa Cruz, e-mail: jmrtwo@ucsc.edu
1 Introduction
Individuals in developing countries are subject to considerable risk but most lack access to formal
mechanisms that would allow them to insure themselves against unexpected income shocks.
Instead, households often use informal systems of gifts and loans to pool idiosyncratic risk. While
these informal networks do provide some protection against shocks, they also face substantial
problems of asymmetric information and payment enforceability, and existing evidence suggests
that inter-household risk sharing networks are rarely, if ever, e¢ cient (Townsend, 1994; Udry,
1994; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003).
In the absence of e¤ective inter-household insurance mechanisms, a natural place for indi-
viduals to choose to cope with risk is within the household. Though such arrangements will be
somewhat limited because income shocks are likely to be correlated within households, whether
these arrangements are e¤ective in insuring the idiosyncratic risk that remains is an important
question. In particular, since information and enforcement are presumably better within a single
household than between di¤erent households, intra-household insurance is the "best hope" for
an informal insurance scheme to overcome information and payment enforceability problems.
If risk is not insured even within the household, despite the substantial incentives household
members should have to insure each other in the absence of other risk-coping strategies, then
micro insurance or other interventions that impact the ability of individuals to cope with risk
will likely have large welfare impacts.
This paper presents results from a eld experiment in Kenya designed to test whether intra-
household risk-sharing arrangements are e¢ cient and, if not, whether limited commitment is a
partial explanation for observed behavior. The experiment followed 142 married couples for 8
weeks. Every week, each individual had a 50% chance of receiving a 150 Kenyan shilling (US $2)
income shock, equivalent to roughly 1.5 daysincome for men and 1 weeks income for women. As
these shocks are, by denition, random, transitory, and idiosyncratic, the experimental design
makes it possible to test directly for allocative e¢ ciency, by comparing the di¤erence in the
responsiveness of individual private consumption between weeks in which an individual receives
the shock himself and weeks in which his spouse receives the shock. If the household pools
risk e¢ ciently, increases in private consumption should be the same for both types of shocks.
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However, I nd that husbands increase their expenditures on privately consumed goods in weeks
in which they receive the shock but do not change their expenditures in weeks in which their
wives receive the shock, a rejection of Pareto e¢ ciency. In contrast, private expenditures by
women are not sensitive to the shocks. Women also transfer part of the shock to their husbands,
but men do not transfer any to their wives.
Both spouses save the majority of the shock, though I am unable to test whether the savings
should be thought of as individual or joint household savings. Since the test in this paper is
for relatively small shocks, the failure of intra-household risk sharing is likely to be even more
pronounced for bigger shocks such as poor harvest or major illness.
The experiment was designed to also explore the possibility that limited commitment caused
by incomplete contract enforceability is a partial explanation for this ine¢ ciency. Under limited
commitment, an individual cannot be legally forced to make the Pareto e¢ cient transfer to his
insurance partner, even if, ex ante, he had agreed to; instead, insurance arrangements must be
self-enforcing. For this reason, non-zero transfers are sustainable only if partners can punish
each other for failing to make payments by, for instance, terminating or limiting the insurance
relationship. Given such a threat, an individual balances the current utility loss from making
a transfer against the long-term expected utility gain from insurance, a constraint which im-
plies that only those transfers which reduce current utility by less than the expected di¤erence
in lifetime utility between insurance and (partial or complete) autarky are feasible. Limited
commitment models have been found to explain both inter-household (Coate and Ravallion,
1993; Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall, 2002) and intra-household (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001;
Wahhaj, 2007) behavior better than other models. Since the complete termination of the insur-
ance relationship is not likely to be realistic for married couples, my assumption in this paper
is that spouses limit rather than completely terminate the insurance relationship in case of
non-payment.
I test for limited commitment by experimentally varying the intra-household correlation
in the random income shocks that were paid out between three, randomly selected Treatment
Groups. In Group 1, the correlation in the experimental shocks was 0.5; in Group 2, it was 0; and
in Group 3, it was -0.5. Prior to the start of the experiment, these correlations were explained
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in lay language to respondents so that they understood the treatment. The intra-household
correlations mean that the gains from insurance were higher in Groups 2 and 3 than in Group
1. If the limited commitment binds, then transfers should be higher in Groups 2 and 3 than in
Group 1, a prediction which holds true for wives but not for husbands: women in Groups 2 and
3 transfer 39 and 44 Kenyan shillings (Ksh) more of the 150 Ksh shock, respectively, than do
women in Group 1. In contrast, transfers from men to women do not respond to the treatment.
These results suggest that limited commitment is relevant within the household, at least for
women, and that intra-household risk sharing is ine¢ cient at least in part because insurance
partners cannot commit ex ante to e¢ cient resource allocation. That the limited commitment
is binding for women but not for men is likely due to the fact that the income shocks were much
larger, in relative terms, for women than for men, and so were more likely to cause a binding
constraint.
The experimental design employed in this paper has several advantages over the empirical
strategies employed in most existing studies of risk sharing or intra-household resource alloca-
tion. First, the experimental shocks are random so that the test for Pareto e¢ ciency is cleanly
identied. Second, the shocks are purely transitory and do not involve a permanent component.
While this distinction is not important under full insurance in which all risk is completely in-
sured, permanent and transitory shocks might be treated very di¤erently if insurance contracts
are subject to renegotiation. For instance, it might be the case that consumption shares can be
renegotiated through a bargaining process, and that bargaining weights depend on permanent
income. If so, a change in consumption due to a permanent change in relative income (holding
total income xed) may be consistent with e¢ ciency.1
In contrast, purely transitory shocks which are small relative to lifetime income should have
no e¤ect on the bargaining weight. Assuming that household members are risk averse, failing to
insure these shocks would leave potential gains from trade unexploited, and would constitute a
rejection of the collective model of the household developed by Chiappori and others (Chiappori,
1Many studies have shown that household decisions are sensitive to ostensibly exogenous changes in relative
intra-household incomes. Examples include Duo (2003), Thomas (1990), Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997),
and Haddad and Hoddinott (1994).
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1992; Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Browning et al., 1994)), which is based on the assumption
that spouses have di¤erent preferences and bargain over outcomes, but that they achieve a
Pareto e¢ cient outcome.
Generally, direct tests of intra-household risk sharing are rare, because they require data
on individual-level income and consumption, which is not available in most datasets. Those
studies that do exist cast some doubt on e¢ ciency. For instance, Goldstein (2004) rejects intra-
household e¢ ciency for a sample of agricultural households in Ghana and nds that individuals
insure themselves through networks outside rather than within the household. Using individual
consumption data from the Philippines, Dubois and Ligon (2005) reject the collective model.
Dercon and Krishnan (2000) show that poor Ethiopian women bear the brunt of negative income
shocks, in terms of reduced body mass. Duo and Udry (2004) show that consumption patterns
in the Cote DIvoire are sensitive to transitory relative income shocks caused by rainfall, which
di¤erentially a¤ect male and female crops. These studies all echo the results of the vast majority
of inter-household risk-sharing studies, which have consistently rejected e¢ ciency.
Third, since the shocks are experimentally generated, I am able to vary their intra-household
correlation to test for limited commitment in a much simpler and more direct way than has
previously been possible. In even the simplest static model (for instance, Coate and Ravallion
(1993)), limited commitment arrangements specify a transfer for every possible state of nature.
In more general dynamic models, transfers may also be history dependent so that they may serve
a quasi-credit role whereby higher current consumption can be nanced by higher future transfer
commitments. Since sustainable transfers depend on a variety of factors that are di¢ cult to
observe (including preferences, levels of risk aversion, rates of time discounting, and altruism),
most tests have involved dynamic programming solutions that depend on assumptions about
these factors (for instance, Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001; Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall, 2002).
Manipulating the correlation in the shocks experimentally presents a much more direct test of
the theory.
Finally, this study is, to my knowledge, the rst eld experiment in risk sharing or intra-
household resource allocation to observe real-world outcomes. Other studies have instead been
conducted in a laboratory or other controlled setting (for example, Ashraf (2005), Barr (2003),
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Charness and Genicot (2004), and Iversen et al. (2006)), which might be less representative of
normal behavior.
2 Theoretical Framework
This section lays out a simple model of intra-household resource allocation in an intertemporal
framework, and follows closely Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002).2 To keep the notation
simple, I assume that there is only one privately consumed good. The households problem is
to maximize a weighted sum of expected utilities:
maxE[
TP
k=t
SP
s=1
k tsum(cImsk(hk)) + 
TP
k=t
SP
s=1
k tsuf (cIfsk(hk)) j 
t] (1)
subject to the budget constraint that
Afs;t+1 +Ams;t+1 = As;t+1 =
P
i=m;f
SP
s=1
(1 + r)(yist +Aist   cIist(ht)) (2)
as well as non-negativity constraints on consumption. In this setup, m and f index the male
and female, s 2 f1; ::; Sg index the state of nature, and the household is assumed to live for T
periods. The discount rate  is assumed to be the same for men and women. um() and uf ()
represent utility functions, cImst and c
I
fst represent consumption vectors under mutual insurance,
 represents the females bargaining weight, and 
t represents information available at time t.
Amst and Afst represent male and female assets, respectively.
In keeping with the experimental design, I assume that s - the probability that state s
occurs - and income realizations are not history dependent. However, consumption allocations
are allowed to depend on the history of shocks received (ht), which allows transfers to serve a
quasi-credit role (Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall, 2002).
As written, equation (2) assumes that assets are pooled within the household. As is well
known, the solution to the problem as written is to equate the ratio of male and female marginal
utilities to the Pareto bargaining weight :
u0m(cmst)
u0f (cfst)
=  (3)
2The section is also very similar to Wahhaj (2007) and Albarran and Attanasio (2003).
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However, if the household is further constrained by a limited commitment constraint, achiev-
ing e¢ ciency may not be possible. After the state of nature is revealed and the contracted-upon
transfer is specied, an individual has the option to renege on his transfer obligation. In the ab-
sence of any punishment, a self-interested individual would always choose to renege, so non-zero
transfers are only sustainable if his insurance partner punishes him for non-payment. Typically
the punishment is thought of as consisting of two components: a moral or social cost P , and a
partial or complete termination of the future insurance relationship. Though most studies as-
sume that the insurance relationship is terminated completely in the case of non-payment, it does
not seem reasonable in this context that spouses would completely terminate the relationship,
so I assume instead that the insurance relationship is interrupted for w periods.3
Denoting autarkic consumption at time t and state s as cAmst, the limited commitment par-
ticipation constraint (for men) is that
u(cImst) + E[
TP
k=t+1
SP
s=1
k tsum(cImsk) j 
t]  u(cAmkt) + (4)
E[
t+w+1P
k=t+1
SP
s=1
k tsum(cAmsk) j 
t] +
E[
TP
k=t+w+2
SP
s=1
k tsum(cImsk) j 
t]  P
An analogous condition applies to women. This constraint implies that current transfers must
be low enough to make mutual insurance more attractive than w periods of autarky.
The solution to this problem is discussed in detail in Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002).
What is important for my analysis is simply that, if the limited commitment constraint (4) does
not bind, then optimality implies the well-known condition that the ratio of marginal utilities
will be set equal to the Pareto weight , as in Equation (3). If, however, the limited commitment
constraint is binding, unconstrained e¢ ciency will not be attainable. Instead, for the partner
with the binding constraint, consumption must be set to satisfy (4).
Empirically, the test for unconstrained Pareto e¢ ciency will be performed by comparing
changes in private consumption between weeks in which the husband receives the shock and
weeks in which the wife receives the shock. Since these shocks are, by denition, transitory,
3This possibility is discussed in Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002).
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the Permanent Income Hypothesis suggests that households should choose to intertemporally
smooth their consumption and save the money (as has been tested in, for instance, Paxson
(1992)). For this reason, it will only be possible to reject e¢ ciency if personal savings do not
allow for complete intertemporal consumption smoothing. As such, the tests in this paper likely
represent lower bounds on the amount of idiosyncratic risk which remains uninsured.
As will be described in more detail later, the experimental design described in this paper
manipulates the potential gains from insurance by varying the intra-household correlation in
the shocks that are received. The signicance of this is that potential gains from insurance
are largest when incomes are negatively correlated, since it is relatively more likely that an
individual who su¤ers a negative income shock will have a partner who receives a positive shock
that can then be shared. If, however, incomes are strongly positively correlated, the scope for
insurance is much more limited.
Empirically, this means that the limited commitment constraint is less likely to bind in
treatments were income shocks are independent or negatively correlated, and more likely to bind
when incomes are positively correlated. The implication is that higher transfers are sustainable
when incomes are less correlated, which forms the basic test of this paper.4
Finally, it should be noted that the test for unconstrained e¢ ciency is based on the assump-
tion that small, transitory shocks should have no e¤ect on lifetime income and, hence, on Pareto
bargaining weights, whereas the test for limited commitment is well specied only to the extent
that di¤erences in the correlation of the shocks will impact the limited commitment constraint
through its e¤ect on the continuation value of insurance. Though these two requirements may
seem at odds, they are compatible because I assume that the punishment for non-payment is
to resort to autarky for w periods, rather than forever. This is ultimately an empirical matter:
if individuals punish a spouses non-payment forever, the treatment will have no e¤ect on the
limited commitment constraint and I will not observe any di¤erence in behavior between the
various treatment groups.
4Albarran and Attanasio (2003) test a similar implication: that transfers are higher if the variance of income
(and hence the utility gain from insurance) is higher.
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3 Experimental Design
This project was conducted between April and October, 2006 among a sample of 142 couples,
drawn from a group of daily income earners (men who work as bicycle taxi drivers - called boda
bodas in Kiswahili - and women who sell produce and other items in the marketplace) in the
towns of Busia, Sega, and Ugunja in Western and Nyanza Provinces, Kenya. Daily income
earners were targeted because the project is focused upon transitory shocks to income, which
are more commonly encountered among daily income earners than in a sample of, for instance,
farmers.
The towns targeted in this study are semi-urban areas located along a major highway from
Nairobi, Kenya to Kampala, Uganda. Though many people in the area earn their living from
agriculture, a substantial fraction earn at least some income from self-employment, as is common
in the developing world (Banerjee and Duo, 2007). Many of these individuals work in town
during the day but live in the surrounding rural areas. In the towns, the bodas are arranged
in stages (which are similar to taxi stands), often at a specic landmark such as a big tree or
near public transportation dropo¤ points along the highway. The same group of bodas will work
from the same location every day, returning there after each fare.5 The market women in this
study sell vegetables and other foodstu¤s from a set location, often along the road.
To recruit individuals into the study, a trained enumerator approached an individual at his
place of work and asked to meet with him individually for a few minutes. The enumerator
rst asked the individual if he was married, and all those that were single were not interviewed
further.6 For those that were married, the enumerator then asked the respondent if he would be
interested in participating in a project that would take approximately 8 weeks to complete, and
that would require the administration of weekly monitoring surveys to both the respondent and
his spouse. In particular, a precondition for participation was that the enumerator be allowed
to visit the spouse at home without the primary respondents supervision. Individuals were told
that the weekly monitoring survey would take approximately 1 hour per week to complete, and
that they would be compensated if they agreed to participate. If the individual was interested
5The standard fare is 10 shillings ($0.14 US) per ride.
6Several individuals lied about being married and were later dropped from the study.
8
in the project, the enumerator took his name and contact information, and told him that we
would return later to begin the project. The spouses consent was obtained later, at the rst
monitoring interview.
Although we did not keep detailed records of those that refused to participate, attrition
was low (approximately 10%). However, the sample is not necessarily representative of the
population of married daily income earners in these areas. In particular, we were unlikely
to nd individuals that worked from town only occasionally, and instead were more likely to
interview those working there regularly.
After enrolling in the study, each spouse was visited by one of ten trained enumerators once
a week for approximately 8 weeks. Each week, the same enumerator visited both spouses and
administered a detailed monitoring survey that included questions on consumption, expendi-
tures, income (and income shocks), and labor supply over the previous 7 days. These surveys
were conducted privately and condentially, and information was not shared with the spouse.7
If one of the spouses could not be found on the day of the survey, the enumerator tried again
for the next several days; if this individual was eventually traced, the enumerator asked about
the same time period that was asked of the spouse (the 7 days prior to the scheduled meeting).
If the individual could not be traced that week, the spouses survey was also dropped, so the
analysis to be presented below includes only those weeks in which information is available for
both spouses. At the conclusion of the project, each individual was administered a background
questionnaire which included questions on access to credit and savings, asset ownership, and
related issues.
To test for intra-household Pareto e¢ ciency, it is necessary to identify exogenous, transitory
shocks to relative incomes. To cleanly identify such shocks, this project randomly provided 150
Kenyan shilling (about US $2) income shocks to participants. The probability of receiving the
shock in a given week was 50% for all participants. To make the payment of the shocks as
transparent as possible, each enumerator carried with him a black plastic bag containing 56
slips of paper with the numbers 1-56 on them. Each number corresponded to a payment for both
spouses. For each spouse, the drawing of 28 of the slips resulted in payment, while the drawing
7 In most cases, the primary respondent was interviewed at work and the spouse at home.
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of the other 28 resulted in no payment. The shocks were announced to each spouse, so that each
knew what the other had gotten. Payments were made privately, however, and individuals were
told that they could spend the money however they chose.
This experimental design has several advantages. First, the shocks are big relative to incomes
in the area, equivalent to approximately 1.5 daysincome for men and 7 daysincome for women
(Table 2, Panel A). Second, since the shocks were publicly observable (unlike many real-world
shocks, which are usually only partially observable), any observed ine¢ ciency is not attributable
to the information available to the spouse, so that comparing the responsiveness of private
consumption to own and spouses income shocks represents a direct test of Pareto e¢ ciency.
Third, through the data collected with the monitoring surveys, it is possible to compare the
experimental results with real world responses to uctuations in weekly labor income.
One disadvantage of the study, however, is that (for ethical and practical reasons) the income
shocks provided were always positive, unlike real-world shocks which can of course be either
positive or negative. If individuals treat gains di¤erently than losses, behavior may di¤er between
positive and negative income shocks. In particular, if individuals are risk averse over gains but
risk loving over losses (an e¤ect referred to as the reection e¤ect by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979)), individuals would be more likely to share risk in this experiment than they would if the
shocks involved losses. This would tend to bias the results towards the acceptance of the null
hypothesis of e¢ cient risk sharing.
The other primary purpose of the eld experiment is to test for intra-household limited
commitment by experimentally manipulating the continuation value of the insurance relation-
ship. As discussed above, the experiment is based on the fact that the value of an insurance
relationship is the expected utility gain from insurance, relative to autarky. Since the potential
gains from insurance are higher the less correlated are partner incomes (since partners are more
likely to be able to make transfers to each other when negative shocks occur), the presence of a
binding limited commitment constraint predicts that higher transfers are sustainable if incomes
are independent or negatively correlated.
To test this implication, the sample was split into 3 groups with varying correlation in the
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probability of receiving the 150 Kenyan shilling income shocks.8 In Group 1, the correlation was
0.5; in group 2, the correlation was 0; and in Group 3, the correlation was -0.5. The payment
schedule that the enumerators carried reected these correlations.
For the treatment to be meaningful, individuals must know and understand the correlation
in the shocks, a task made somewhat di¢ cult by the average level of education in this sample,
which is 7.72 years for men and 7.02 years for women (Table 1). To ensure comprehension,
each enumerator read from a prepared script which made no specic mention of correlations
but emphasized instead the probability that both the respondent and his spouse would either
both receive or both not receive the shock.9 These probabilities were presented both as specic
percentages or odds (i.e., 75% or 3/4), and as general likelihoods (i.e., "more than half the time").
At the end of the script, individuals answered questions about the various probabilities, and any
misunderstandings were discussed. A shorter script and follow-up comprehension questionnaire
were later administered during the course of the experiment. In general, individuals seemed to
understand the setup.
4 Data
4.1 Background Information
Summary statistics from the background survey are reported in Table 1.10 From Panel A,
just over 84% of the men in the sample are bicycle taxi drivers, while the rest are distributed
among various other jobs. Fifty-three percent of women report having no job. The sample is
predominantly of the Luo tribe, and the remainder is Luhya.11 The average man in the sample
8These groups were randomly picked by computer after individuals expressed interest in the project but before
any data collection began.
9For instance, individuals in Group 1 were told that, if they received the shock, the probability that their
spouse would also receive the shock was 3/4; if they did not receive the shock, the probability that the spouse
would also not receive the shock was again 3/4.
10Table 1 includes information on 137 men and 132 women, out of 142 in the sample. The remainder could not
be traced for this survey.
11The Luo are the most populous tribe in Nyanza Province (making up 53% of the Provinces population), and
the Luhya are the most populous in Western Province (making up 84% of the Population). Overall, the Luo make
up 12% of the Kenyan population and the Luhya make up 15% (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004).
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is 30.6 years old, the average woman is 24.5, and the average respondent received 7.4 years of
education. The average couple has 2.6 children and 3.4 dependents. Though not shown in this
Table, most respondents live in the surrounding rural areas and travel to town for work.
Panel B presents statistics on access to savings and credit, which will a¤ect the limited com-
mitment constraint. Though formal savings accounts are very rare (just over 1% of respondents
have a savings account in a bank or micronance institution), 63.0% of men and 43.8% of women
participate in Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs). For those in ROSCAs, the
average amount contributed in the past year was over 3,000 Kenyan shillings (Ksh) for men
(equivalent to US $43) and 2,000 Ksh (US $29) for women, a signicant amount given the aver-
age labor income in the sample. Similarly, formal credit is nearly unheard of; however, the vast
majority of both men and women have access to informal credit in the form of gifts and loans
from friends and family. Again, the amounts given and received are relatively large: the average
amounts given and received were 1,374 Ksh (US $20) and 1,998 Ksh (US $28), respectively.
Most of these households do not, however, receive transfers from other individuals within their
household (other than the spouse), as only 4.1% of individuals report receiving money from
another member of the household, and only 7.4% report receiving support from other members
of the household in purchasing shared items (results not shown).12
Panel C presents statistics on asset ownership. Though assets are primarily controlled by the
male, females do hold assets as well. On average, men own 0.79 acres of land, compared to 0.15
acres for women.13 Similarly, women control a total of a bit less than 950 Ksh (US $14) worth
of animals and other durable goods, compared to more than 5,600 Ksh (US $80) for men.14
12Many of these individuals live in family compounds, in which each adult couple has their own dwelling but
the distinction between di¤erent households in the same compound might not be very sharp.
13The per acre value of land controlled by women appears to be much lower than that of men. However, since
these gures are self-reports, they should be taken with some caution.
14Durable goods include beds, sofas, tables, chairs, cookers, radios, TVs, mobile and landline phones, clocks,
watches, sewing machines, irons, bicycles, and bednets.
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4.2 Overview of Monitoring Data
Table 2 provides some summary information from the weekly monitoring visits. Due to some
problems with certain enumerators, particularly towards the beginning of the data collection
activities, the database is trimmed of the top and bottom 1% of responses for individual and
household expenditures, as well as savings outliers. In addition, some surveys had signicant
problems and had to be dropped. This leaves 914 visits for 142 couples. All gures in the tables
are weekly totals.
Panel A presents summary statistics on weekly labor income and hours (not including agri-
culture). Income for those selling produce or other items (who are mostly female), is calculated
as the di¤erence in sales and money spent restocking.15 Of the couples sampled for the survey,
husbands make about 718 Kenyan shillings per week (just over US $10) and wives about 143
shillings (about US $2). For men, this income comes primarily from their regular job (which,
for most, is working as a bicycle taxi driver); for women, income comes largely from informal
sources, such as occasional sales of agricultural produce, rather than regular labor income. Even
women without jobs earn some money: average income for such women is 53 Ksh (US $0.70)
per week, compared to 231 Ksh (US $3.30) for women with jobs (Table 2 footnote). In relative
terms, then, the experimental income shocks are very large, especially for women: the $2 shock
is equivalent to roughly 1.5 days income for men and over a weeks income for women. To
put this in terms of a developed country equivalent, for men, the shock is equivalent to roughly
$200 for a worker making $50,000 per year. For women, the shock is much larger, equivalent to
roughly $950.
Though I have collected data on both consumption and expenditures, I will focus on expen-
ditures throughout the paper, for several reasons. First, to reduce the length of the monitoring
survey, the consumption questions were asked only at the household level so that I do not have
specic measures of individual consumption shares: the only additional information that the
consumption data provides is household in-kind saving or dissaving over periods (which was
in fact small) or household consumption of own-farm produce. Second, the test of e¢ ciency
15 If individuals consume some of their inventory at home, this method may give inaccurate estimates of both
income and consumption. However, home consumption was minimal in this sample.
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employed in this paper concerns the consumption of private goods (alcohol, cigarettes, soda,
clothing and shoes, hairstyling, entertainment, newspapers, own meals in restaurants, trans-
portation and various other items), and expenditures on these items are equal to consumption
in most cases. This is because individual consumption should di¤er from individual expenditures
only if a share of the expenditure was allocated to another household member, or if individuals
saved a portion of the expenditure for future consumption or consumed expenditures that had
been saved in a previous period (for example, by consuming maize that had been purchased the
week before). However, expenditures that were allocated to another individual were recorded
as in-kind transfers in the monitoring survey, so that all amounts that I quantify as individual
expenditures were eventually consumed by the given individual. Also, though certain private
items could in principle be saved for future use (such as cigarettes or bottled beer), in practice
these were consumed immediately.
Panel B of Table 2 presents the expenditure data. The rst few rows of Panel B show total
expenditures, total shared expenditures, and total private expenditures, while the following rows
show specic expenditure subcategories. Shared expenditures include all shared food consumed
at home, expenditures on children, as well as other shared items such as soap and cleaning
supplies, rent, and household bills such as water, kerosene and rewood. Total expenditures
include shared and private expenditures, medical expenditures, and charity.
Total household expenditures are roughly 1,250 Ksh (US $17.80) per week, over two thirds
of which is paid for by the male. The majority of these expenditures are concentrated on shared
goods (taking up about 64% of household expenditures), though total private expenditures
average roughly 26% of total household expenditures, with over 75% of these private expenditures
going to men. Interestingly, nearly one third of male private expenditure are meals in restaurants,
likely because men tend to eat lunch outside the home when they are working. Only about
10% of private expenditures appear to be spent on alcohol, soda, or cigarettes, a result which,
anecdotally, appears lower than true expenditures on these items and is likely indicative of
underreporting. In total, the amount spent on private items is over 2.5 times the roughly
10% found by Goldstein (2004), which is perhaps indicative of cultural or sample composition
di¤erences.
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Panel C of Table 2 presents summary statistics on transfers (dened as positive for outows
and negative for inows) between spouses and with individuals outside of the household, and
on net savings in Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs). The transfer gures
include both cash and in-kind transfers. For this reason, if the husband were to purchase items
for his wife, these purchases are recorded as transfers and not as expenditures. In total, women
receive an average of 59 Ksh per week from their husbands, the vast majority of which are gifts
rather than loans. The households in the sample received an average of 37 Ksh from outside
the household, which seems reasonable since this population is not particularly a­ uent. Finally,
men and women save an average of 28 Ksh and 26 Ksh per week in ROSCAs, respectively.
5 Testing for E¢ ciency
5.1 Empirical Framework
It is usually di¢ cult to test for e¢ ciency directly, as it is rare to have data on individual con-
sumption shares cmst and cfst. Instead, researchers typically make inferences based on changes
in aggregate household consumption cmst + cfst on goods that can be assigned to one member
or the other (i.e., Browning et al., 1994; Duo and Udry, 2004). In this study, however, I have
collected individual panel data on expenditures and so will be able to perform a direct test.
Omitting the state index s for simplicity (and because the set of possible experimental states
is described completely by the combination of the shocks that are received), I will run a reduced
form specication (for each consumption category), as follows:
cit = Sit + Sjt + i + t + "it (5)
where the dependent variable cit is private expenditures. To remove the unobserved individual
error term i, I estimate the equation by xed e¤ects. I control for time e¤ects t by including
indicators for the week of the interview. The standard errors for all regressions are clustered at
the household level.
The test of Pareto e¢ ciency is simply that the shocks only a¤ect private expenditures through
their e¤ect on the budget constraint, or that:
 =  (6)
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As noted previously, if the household behaves in accordance with the Permanent Income
Hypothesis, the shocks will be saved and private consumption will not be sensitive to the shocks
whatsoever. Thus, it will be impossible to reject e¢ ciency if the shocks are entirely saved.
The transitory nature of the shocks also means that the test proposed here is not a test of
income pooling, but a test of whether the shocks to income are pooled (Dercon and Krishnan,
2000).
5.2 Testing the Model: Individual Data
The results from estimating the reduced form specication (5) by xed e¤ects are presented in
Panels A (for the male) and B (for the female) in Table 3.16 The dependent variables in this
Table are individual expenditures by each spouse. For ease of interpretation, all coe¢ cients
have been divided by the size of the experimental shock (150 Kenyan shillings), so that the
coe¢ cients in the Table can be interpreted as a percentage of the shock. However, due to small
changes in weekly labor income and in expenditures, the coe¢ cients do not necessarily sum to
1. In both Panels, Columns 1-3 present aggregated results for overall total expenditures, total
shared expenditures, and total private expenditures, respectively, while Columns 4-11 present
results for various subcategories (several subcategories are not included). Column 3, therefore,
represents the main test of Pareto e¢ ciency. In all specications, I include controls for the week
of the interview, and cluster the standard errors by household.
For both males and females, total own expenditures appear to increase in weeks in which
the shock is received and to actually decrease in weeks in which the spouse receives the shock,
though neither e¤ect is statistically signicant. Similarly, there does not seem to be much of an
e¤ect with respect to shared expenditures.
Of more interest is the test of Pareto e¢ ciency, which is presented in Column 3. Men spend
about 21.2% (32 Ksh) of their own shock on private items, a result which is statistically signicant
at 5%. Meanwhile, male private expenditures actually decrease (insignicantly) when a shock is
received by the female. Since the di¤erence in these 2 coe¢ cients is statistically signicant (at
16Running these as IV regressions with the shocks as instruments for income gives identical results, since the
shocks did not have a statistically signicant impact on labor income or on hours worked (see Appendix Table 1).
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the 2% level), these results constitute a rejection of the Pareto e¢ cient collective model of the
household. Though the data lacks power to assign this increase to specic categories, there are
increases in spending on clothing, meals in restaurants, and in other private categories (which
includes transportation, personal hygiene products, bicycle expenditures, and other private items
such as airtime for cell phones). In total, this increase of 32 shillings on private expenditures
amounts to an approximately 13% increase in weekly male private expenditures.17
Panel B indicates, however, that women do not spend the experimental shock as men do.
Column 3 of Panel B shows there is no change in female private expenditures in weeks in
which she receives the shock. The only change in the overall pattern of female expenditures is
an increase in medical expenditures, which may reect female preferences but which may also
represent female contributions to shared household expenses. Finally (and strangely), women
appear to spend more money on animals or construction when a shock is received by her spouse
than when she herself receives a shock, though the e¤ect is small.
Panel C shows the e¤ect of the shock on savings in ROSCAs, total savings18 and transfers.
It appears from Panel C that the majority of the shock is saved: men save 88.1% of the shock,
women save 57.4%. Note that the Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) predicts that the entire
shock should be saved, so that the marginal propensity to save out of the shock should be 1.
Given the relatively large standard errors from these estimates, I cannot reject the PIH for either
spouse.
Interestingly, men do not seem to share much or any of the shock with their spouse in the
form of transfers. Men send 7.7% of the shock to their wife (and 5.2% outside the household),
though both e¤ects are statistically insignicant. Women, by contrast, send 16.2% of the shock
(about 24 shillings) to their husbands (signicant at 1%), and 8.6% (statistically insignicant)
outside the household.
One issue that I cannot explore with my data is whether savings of the experimental shocks
are pooled within the household or held individually. From Table 4, women appear to invest
part of the money into their own Rotating Savings and Credit Associations, which are typically
17These results are very similar if an interaction term between the 2 shocks is included in the regression.
18Savings are dened as the sum of total income (including the experimental shock), transfers, and bank and
ROSCA ows minus total expenditures.
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individually controlled. It has been argued that ROSCA savings are a way for women to save up
for durable goods (Anderson and Baland, 2002). Similarly, it is entirely possible that informal
savings ("under the mattress") are privately rather than jointly controlled. If so, these savings
responses may in themselves be violations of the strongest form of intra-household e¢ ciency,
though I cannot adequately address these issues here. However, it remains possible that women
as well as men do not fully share the experimental shock.
5.3 Household Data
One additional test of Pareto e¢ ciency is that the total household propensity to save out of male
and female income should be equal. This prediction is tested using an Instrumental Variables
specication, in which individual male and female incomes are instrumented with the shock.
Table 4, Panel A presents the rst stage and shows a strong relationship between the shocks
and total income (see Appendix Table 1 for evidence that the shocks did not signicantly impact
labor hours or income). Panel B presents the IV results for savings and other expenditure
categories. The estimated propensities to save out of male and female income are 0.936 and
0.911, respectively. Since the di¤erence between these estimates is not statistically signicant, I
do not reject e¢ ciency in regards to savings. In addition, both propensities are indistinguishable
from 1, in line with the PIH.
6 Limited Commitment
6.1 Empirical Methodology
As the results in the previous section represent a rejection of Pareto e¢ ciency, the remainder
of the paper will test whether limited commitment might serve as a partial explanation for
the results. Ideally, this test would focus on private expenditures. However, expenditures are
measured somewhat imprecisely in my data, so I will instead focus mainly on observed transfers
(however, I will also present expenditure results). The basic test will be of the form
 it = 1G1iSit + 2G2iSit + 3G3iSit + 1G1iSjt + 2G2iSjt + 3G3iSjt + i + t + "it (7)
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where G2i and G3i are indicators for Groups 2 and 3, respectively. Simple risk sharing will imply
that 1, 2, and 3 are all > 0 and that 1, 2, and 3 are < 0 (however, note that men did not
transfer any of the shock to their wives). Under limited commitment, an additional prediction
is that 3 > 2 > 1 and 3 < 2 < 1.
Since the empirical methodology utilized here is conditional on the shocks, the test of limited
commitment is whether - given the exact same set of shocks - households in which experimental
incomes are less correlated transfer more than households where experimental incomes are more
correlated. If the test were not conditional on the shocks, a spurious correlation would likely
appear: since households in, for instance, Group 3 are more likely to be in opposite states of
nature than households in Group 1, they will tend to send transfers more regularly. However,
conditional on the same realization of shocks, transfers should not di¤er.
7 Testing for Limited Commitment
7.1 Checking Randomization
As discussed in the experimental design section, the sample was randomly divided into 3 Treat-
ment Groups. However, the randomization was done before collecting the background data,
so it was impossible to stratify by background characteristics, which means that there might
exist di¤erences between groups. Table 5 presents baseline di¤erences between the Treatment
Groups, along with an F-test for joint equality of the 3 means. The standard errors are clustered
by couple.
There are 33 outcomes in Table 5, several of which signicantly di¤er between Groups at
the 5% level: the proportion that is Protestant, the proportion that knows a divorced friend or
family member, and the proportions that believe that the stigma from divorce and separation are
"not at all negative." These small di¤erences appear to be due to random chance, and suggest
that there do not exist signicant pre-program di¤erences between the Treatment Groups.19 In
addition, all experimental results are estimated by xed e¤ects, so that mean di¤erences due
19However, the small sample size and clustered standard errors make it hard to nd statistically signicant
di¤erences between Groups.
19
to background variables will be di¤erenced out - the coe¢ cients will be biased only if there are
interaction e¤ects between pre-treatment di¤erences and the experimental shocks that are not
captured by the xed e¤ects.
7.2 Experimental Evidence
Table 6 presents the second major result of this paper. Panel A shows the limited commitment
results for women, and Panel B shows the results for men. Women in Group 1 do not transfer any
of the shock to their husbands, while women in Groups 2 and 3 transfer 23.5% and 26.9% of the
shock, respectively. The Table also reports p-values for the (1-sided) tests of limited commitment
that 3 > 1, 2 > 1, and that 3 > 1. I am able to reject the null in individual comparisons
between Groups 1 and 3, and Groups 1 and 2. However, I cannot reject the null between Groups
2 and 3, due in large part to the relatively low power of the dataset. Nevertheless, these results
are consistent with the presence of a limited commitment constraint for women.
There is, however, no experimental evidence of limited commitment among men in this study.
From Panel B, there are no di¤erence in transfer behavior in any of the three Treatment Groups.
In fact, transfers do not signicantly di¤er from zero in any of the 3 Groups. Though the results
in the previous section suggest that male private expenditures are sensitive to the shock, and
that they do not share the experimental shock with their spouses, the results in this Table
imply that limited commitment is not the explanation for this behavior. A likely explanation
for the fact that the constraint doesnt bind for men is that the shocks are too small to cause
the constraint to bind.
Appendix Table 2 explores the e¤ect of the experimental treatment on savings and other
expenditure categories and presents p-values for tests of equality between the various combi-
nations of interactions. The only di¤erences which are signicant at 10% are female shared
expenditures, male total expenditures, and male savings. Again, it is di¢ cult to make much of
this given the noisiness in these measures.
20
7.3 History Dependence
As discussed previously, limited commitment models may be either static or dynamic. The key
di¤erence between these two is that a dynamic system allows for history dependence, while static
models specify a set of transfers that are state- but not history-dependent. History dependence
allows transfers to serve a quasi-credit role, in which higher transfers in the present can be
exchanged for lower future transfers.
I will test for history dependence by running a reduced form xed e¤ects regression of the
form
 it = Sit + Sjt + hit +  hjt + i + t + "it (8)
I will use several specications for the history hit: the overall sum of shocks received (
t 1P
k=1
Sik),
the shock from the previous period (Sit 1), and the sum of shocks from the previous 2 periods
(Sit 1 + Sit 2).
Table 7 presents the reduced form estimates of Equation (8) for women. As expected, the
coe¢ cients for the receipt of the income shock are positive in all specications and in line with
the previous results. However, the coe¢ cients on the history variables are of the opposite sign
than what would be expected by limited commitment: transfers appear to be increasing in the
history of own income shocks received and decreasing in the history of spouse shocks received,
though many of these coe¢ cients are insignicant.20 Limited commitment would instead suggest
that an individuals transfers should be lower if he had previously received a positive shock, as
he would have presumably transferred part of that shock to his spouse and should now be paid
back in the form of lower transfers. However, the p-values for the F-tests of joint signicance
are 0.552, 0.494, and 0.210, respectively, so it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of no
history dependence given the small sample size.
Taken jointly, the results in these Tables suggest that limited commitment is relevant for
women. In the next section, I will discuss various alternative interpretations of the results and
present further evidence in favor of the argument that limited commitment is the explanation
for the observed results.
20The number of observations goes down in Columns 2 and 3 as I drop the 1st observation and then the rst 2
observations for each individual.
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8 Discussion
The preceding section raise several questions which I will attempt to address in this section.
In particular, I focus on three important issues. First, are these results subject to alternative
explanations such as di¤erential levels of risk aversion between spouses? Second, are the results
externally valid? Third, limited commitment would suggest that the gains to insurance were
much lower towards the end of the experiment. Given this, how did transfers compare at the
beginning and end of the experiment?
8.1 Di¤erential Preferences Between Men and Women
The tests utilized in this paper assume that husbands and wives have identical risk preferences.
If they do not, it is not e¢ cient for the spouses to pool all idiosyncratic risk; instead, it is optimal
for the least risk averse partner to accept some idiosyncratic risk while his partner is insured
(Mazzocco and Saini, 2007). Empirically, it has been repeatedly shown that men tend to be
less risk averse than women (Croson and Gneezy, 2004), which would imply that the results in
Table 4 are not necessarily incompatible with e¢ ciency. I will address this question directly by
making use of experimentally elicited measures of risk aversion that were collected during the
course of the experiment.
In particular, I elicited risk preference from both spouses by asking them several risk aversion
questions. The questions follow Charness and Genicot (2004) and ask individuals how much they
would like to invest in an asset which pays o¤ 2.5 times what is invested with probability 0.5,
and 0 with probability 0.5. To incentivize respondents, they were told that one of the questions
would be randomly selected for payment at the end of the experiment. After the experiment
ended, a question was randomly picked, each respondent was given the amount that he decided
to keep, and a coin was ipped to determine if the amount invested would be multiplied by 2.5
or would be lost.
Gender di¤erences in risk aversion are presented in Table 8, Panel A. On average, men do
invest approximately 10% more in the risky investment and so appear to be less risk averse
than women, though this di¤erence is statistically insignicant. As a rst pass, these di¤erences
do not appear large enough to generate the entire observed di¤erence in behavior, but I will
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examine this in more detail below.
A similar preference-based explanation for the result that women transfer some of the shock
to their husbands but men do not transfer much to their wives is that women are more altruistic
than men and derive more utility from their husbandsconsumption than men do from their
wives. To examine this possibility, I elicited preferences for altruism by asking each individual
to play a dictator game with their spouse. Individuals were asked to divide a sum of money
between themselves and their spouse, and truth telling was again ensured by randomly picking
one of their responses for payment. By necessity, the choices made by individuals were known
by their spouses. Respondents were also asked to divide a sum between themselves and an
anonymous stranger, but these choices were not actually paid out at the end of the experiment
so the incentives to truth tell were limited. However, responses to both sets of questions were
highly correlated.
Gender di¤erences in altruism are presented in Table 8, Panel B. Interestingly, men give more
in the dictator game than do women (this is in contrast to the studies surveyed in Croson and
Gneezy, 2004). This result holds both in choices for anonymous strangers and for the spouse.
This counter-intuitive result may not necessarily reect inherent altruistic preferences, however.
The amounts to be divided were very large in size for women (amounting to approximately
33%-100% of the average womens weekly wage), but much smaller for men due to their larger
incomes, so these di¤erences may simply reect declining marginal utility of income. Regardless,
since the weekly shocks were of similar sizes as these dictator payments, it appears that altruism
is not a likely explanation.
To explore these issues more formally, I re-run Equation (5) for spouses with similar pref-
erences on the risk aversion and dictator games in Appendix Table 3. In particular, I restrict
these regressions to couples with di¤erences of no greater than 10 Ksh in the share of 100 Ksh
that was invested in the risky asset, or di¤erences of no greater than 10 Ksh in the amount
given to the spouse in the 100 Ksh dictator game. Ninety-ve of the 142 couples (67%) qualify
for the risk aversion regression, and 85 (65%) quality for the altruism regression. It is apparent
from Appendix Table 3 that these couples behave similarly to the rest of the sample: women
but not men transfer money to their spouses, and men but not women increase their private
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expenditures in response to the shocks. Given this, it seems fair to conclude that di¤erential
preferences are not the explanation for the results found in this paper.
8.2 External Validity
Concerns may also be raised regarding the external validity of this study, on several fronts.
First, since the experimental shocks here are always positive but real-world shocks can be either
positive or negative, it may be that behavior here is not completely realistic. While it is di¢ cult
to completely alleviate this concern, several behavioral results suggest that such a bias would
tend to bias my results towards zero. In particular, Kahneman and Tversky (1979), among
others, have noted that individuals tend to be risk loving over losses but risk averse over gains.
If so, people should be more likely to insure gains than losses, which would imply that my
estimates of the responsiveness of male private consumption to the experimental shocks would
be a lower bound on the true e¤ect.
A separate and perhaps more serious concern is that the experimental treatment described
in this paper was seen as a game by these couples, and that they behaved di¤erently in the game
than they would have if the shocks had been real. This issue could be at least partially addressed
if it were possible to identify real-world idiosyncratic income shocks that a¤ect individual income
(for instance, health shocks). Unfortunately, my measures of health and other shocks are too
weak for such an exercise.
Instead, I examine the e¤ect of week-to-week uctuations in individual labor income on
transfers, savings, and expenditures. Though labor supply and income are clearly not exogenous,
this approach is valid if it can be assumed that permanent income is constant for the 8 weeks
in which couples were followed, and that any deviation between income in a given week and
average weekly income is exogenous. While this assumption may be subject to criticism, it is
hopefully reasonable enough for my purpose here.
The results are presented in Table 9. Just as in the experimental results section, Panels A
and B present expenditures and Panel C presents savings. In general, labor income uctuations
appears to be spent similarly to the experimental shocks. For both men and women, increases
in own income are associated with increases in total expenditures and shared expenditures, as
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spouses contribute more towards household expenditures in weeks in which they make a larger
share of household income. The more immediately relevant result is that both male and female
expenditures are increasing in own income (though the increase for women is not quite signicant
at 10%), but not in the spouses income (Column 3). For men, this increase comes primarily
from meals in restaurants21 and from other private items; for women, the increase comes largely
from spending on clothing. These results lend additional support to the notion that idiosyncratic
risk is not pooled, and also suggest that women may also keep some idiosyncratic income for
themselves.
The propensity to save out of current labor income is high: the estimated propensity 0.726
for men and 0.796 for women (Panel C), both of which are signicantly di¤erent from 1. If labor
income were truly exogenous, this represents a rejection of the Permanent Income Hypothesis.
This is similar to the experimental results in Table 3 (though, in that case, those estimates were
not signicantly di¤erent from 1, due to the large standard errors). Interestingly, transfers within
the household (for either spouse) do not respond signicantly to changes in relative incomes,
but transfers outside the household do. This is similar to the results in Goldstein (2004), who
found that agricultural couples receive insurance from outside the household, but that within-
household insurance is limited. This nding, which conicts with the female transfers observed
experimentally, constitutes the one major di¤erence between the experimental and real-world
shocks. Aside from that, the results in this Table are largely consistent with the experimental
results.
I further test whether the results are consistent with limited commitment by examining how
the amount of risk that is shared varies with background characteristics of the spouses. Under
limited commitment, risk sharing should be more limited for individuals for whom the utility
loss from autarky is small. For instance, we might expect that risk sharing would be limited for
individuals with more assets or for individuals with better access to formal or informal credit.
I examine these possibilities in Table 10. In this Table, I interact the shocks with background
21Note that the e¤ect of male income on meals in restaurants need not be causal. Since most men in the sample
work away from home, they tend to eat lunch at restaurants when they are working, so that meals in restaurants
and labor income may be spuriously correlated through labor supply. However, the relationship holds even when
controlling for hours spent working, so that this does not appear to be the only explanation for the result.
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characteristics.22 Panels A and B present results for females and males, respectively. In the Ta-
ble, I interact the shocks with levels of asset ownership, access to informal credit through friends
and family, and with indicators for whether the respondent reports being able to make indepen-
dent nancial decisions. All questions on asset ownership and access to loans are standardized
to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
From Panel A, all of these interactions have the expected negative sign, though only the
interaction with the amount saved in a ROSCA is signicant at 10%. That ROSCA participation
seems to a¤ect the limited commitment constraint suggests that the guaranteed income that
ROSCAs provide has a signicant impact on female autarkic utility. It is of course very di¢ cult
to rule out the possibility that this interaction reects other unobserved di¤erences between
women that participate in ROSCAs and women that do not, though the results are suggestive.
Similar results are found for men in Panel B. In particular, men with larger land holdings
transfer less of the shock to their wives. However, the sign of these coe¢ cients are less clear
than for women, perhaps because the 150 Ksh were too small to a¤ect the limited commitment
constraint for men. In fact, the coe¢ cients on the interactions for loans given and received and
on the amount saved in ROSCAs are actually positive.
8.3 Behavior Towards the End of the Experiment
The test of limited commitment utilized in this paper requires that the shocks a¤ect the value
of insurance relative to autarky. As the experiment approached its conclusion, however, the
correlation in the shocks should not have much a¤ected behavior. For this reason, a nal test
of the limited commitment model is to compare behavior in the last few periods to behavior
earlier on.
To this end, I separately examine transfers (again, from the female to the male) in the nal
2 weeks of the experiment and in earlier weeks, in Appendix Table 4. Excluding the nal 2
weeks, women in Group 1 transfer 0.058 of the shock to their husbands, while women in Groups
2 and 3 transfer 0.270 (signicant at 1%) and 0.164 (not signicant) of the shock, respectively.
22Due to the limited power of the data because of the small sample size, I include interactions for only one
spouse at a time.
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By contrast, in the nal 2 weeks, women in Groups 2 and 3 transfer only 0.072 and 0.113 of
the shock. Both of these latter estimates are insignicantly di¤erent from 0, though the small
sample size and large standard errors make it impossible to reject the hypothesis that these
estimates are equal to those in the earlier periods. Of course, since the standard errors of both
estimates are large due to the reduced sample size, these estimates should be interpreted with
some care. Nonetheless, it does appear that transfers were higher earlier in the experiment,
in agreement with the hypothesis that limited commitment is the primary explanation for the
di¤erential behavior between the 3 Groups.
9 Conclusion
This paper has presented evidence that suggests that intra-household risk-sharing arrangements
in Kenya are ine¢ cient and that limited commitment may be a partial explanation for that
ine¢ ciency. Employing the results of a eld experiment conducted among a sample of 142
daily income earners and their spouses, in which each individual received 150 Kenyan shilling
income shocks with 50% probability, I have shown that men increase their private consumption
in response to transitory income shocks, a violation of Pareto e¢ ciency. While this is in line
with a number of other studies that reject the unitary household model, the nding that male
consumption is responsive to even a transitory income shock is also a rejection of the more
general collective model.
To test whether limited commitment is a partial explanation for these results, I randomly
split the sample into 3 Treatment Groups, between which the within-couple correlation in exper-
imental payments was varied. As the continuation value of the insurance partnership is greatest
when incomes are least correlated, limited commitment models would predict that transfers
would be highest and risk sharing would be most e¤ective in the Groups with least correlation.
Indeed, I nd that women make signicantly higher transfers when incomes are less or negatively
correlated, suggesting that limited commitment is a constraint on risk sharing.
In demonstrating the importance of limited commitment, this paper contributes to a sub-
stantial intra-household risk-sharing literature. Interest in this eld is generated partly because
insurance within a single household is likely to su¤er less from the information and enforcement
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problems that exist in inter-household insurance arrangements, and because married couples
in developing countries should have an incentive to insure each other because of the lack of
alternative risk-sharing mechanisms. Given this, many have argued that, if e¢ cient insurance
is to be found anywhere, it is to be found within the household. This paper suggests that it
is not to be found anywhere: just like any other insurance system with incomplete contracts,
the self-interest of insurance partners limits the e¤ectiveness of the system. Married or not,
individuals that nd themselves in a favorable state relative to their partner always have an
incentive to reduce transfers below their Pareto e¢ cient levels, making full insurance di¢ cult.
Future work may explore the role of preferences for reciprocity or fairness in informal risk-
sharing arrangements. In particular, the standard limited commitment model predicts that
individuals resort to autarky as a punishment for non-payment. At a more basic level, this
punishment strategy likely reects an inherent preference for fairness or for reciprocity, and
such preferences likely form the underpinning of the punishment which makes more than a
minimal level of risk-sharing possible.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3)
Overall Males Females
A.  Background Information
Occupation:
  Bicycle Taxi Driver 0.424 0.842 0.000
  Market Stall 0.178 0.045 0.313
  Shopkeeper 0.004 0.008 0.000
  Housewife / no job 0.273 0.015 0.534
  Teacher 0.004 0.008 0.000
  Other 0.114 0.075 0.153
Luo Tribe 0.870 0.880 0.860
Age 27.58 30.57 24.47
(8.40) (8.71) (6.83)
Education 7.39 7.72 7.02
(2.28) (2.41) (2.07)
Can Read Swahili 0.831 0.875 0.785
Can Write Swahili 0.793 0.860 0.723
Number of children 2.58
(2.08)
Number of dependents 3.37
(2.57)
B.  Access to Savings / Informal Credit
Has Savings Account 0.012 0.016 0.008
Participates in ROSCA 0.536 0.630 0.438
Amount Saved in ROSCAs (for those 2665 3097 2035
     in ROSCAs) (4198) (4733) (3200)
Received gift or loan in last year 0.914 0.919 0.908
Amount received in gifts and 1998 2393 1589
     loans (2386) (2593) (2083)
Gave gift or loan in last year 0.846 0.886 0.803
Amount given in gifts and 1374 1806 930
     loans (2361) (2944) (1428)
Panel C. Asset Ownership
Acres of land owned 0.475 0.788 0.150
(1.260) (1.640) (0.496)
Value of land owned 24708 44012 3919
(80380) (106868) (18206)
Value of Durable Goods Owned 1771 2708 797
(3585) (4570) (1652)
Value of Animals Owned 1555 2914 145
(11239) (15635) (838)
Observations 267 136 131
Notes:  All figures are self-reported means. Table reports results for 136 men 
and 131 women, out of 142 in the project. The rest could not be traced for this survey.
Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 2. Summary Statistics from Monitoring Surveys
Panel A. Income (1) (2)
Male Female
Total Labor Income 718.37 142.72
(741.96) (570.04)
Total Income, Including Experimental 797.98 222.27
     Shocks (749.40) (575.64)
Total Hours Worked 55.46 16.46
(64.99) (32.88)
Panel B. Expenditures (1) (2) (3) (4)
Male Female Household Total Share of Household Total
Total Expenditures 843.34 390.77 1244.60 -
(521.88) (404.87) (715.20)
     Total Shared 524.17 268.64 799.77 0.64
(403.36) (291.95) (529.20)
     Total Private 246.38 74.23 321.62 0.26
(195.50) (151.21) (257.59)
     Medical 42.67 25.12 68.24 0.05
(103.10) (89.99) (153.21)
Private Categories
Alcohol, Soda, Cigarettes 27.69 4.36 32.08 0.03
(51.35) (17.85) (54.53)
Own Clothing and Shoes 20.97 21.64 42.72 0.03
(84.94) (76.68) (116.76)
Hairstyling, Entertainment, & 12.59 6.39 19.09 0.02
 Newspapers (25.19) (21.73) (34.26)
Restaurant Meals for Self 73.55 5.34 78.93 0.06
(80.07) (24.13) (84.06)
Other Own 111.58 36.50 148.81 0.12
(122.41) (113.23) (172.67)
Shared Categories
Items for Children 18.15 16.80 35.16 0.03
(69.46) (54.72) (91.80)
Animal Purchases and Construction 14.24 4.88 19.12 0.02
(81.73) (34.15) (88.81)
Shared Food 381.05 192.79 578.59 0.46
(274.12) (202.27) (338.72)
Other Shared 110.26 54.17 166.95 0.13
(210.90) (112.61) (263.28)
Panel C. Transfers and Savings (1) (2) (3)
Male Female Household Total
(Net) Transfers to Spouse 58.72 - -
(146.47) - -
(Net) Transfers Outside HH -19.92 -16.75 -36.66
(356.21) (319.02) (474.45)
ROSCA Savings 28.39 25.91 52.99
(212.68) (173.74) (273.74)
Observations 914 914 914
Number of IDs 142 142 142
Note: Number of observations slightly different for certain variables.
Shared expenditures include all shared food consumed at home, as well as other shared items such as soap 
and cleaning supplies, rent, and other household expenses such as water, kerosene, and firewood.
Private expenditures include alcohol, cigarettes, soda, clothing and shoes, hairstyling, entertainment,
newspapers, own meals in restaurants, transportaion and various other items.
Total expenditures equal the sum of total shared, total private, items for children, medical, 
animals & construction, and charity.  Transfers are positive for outflows and negative for inflows.
Average labor income is 231 shillings for women with a job, 53 shillings for women without a job.
Household totals in Panels B and C include totals from other household members.
Standard deviations in parentheses. 
Table 3. Experimental Shocks on Individual-Level Outcomes (Reduced Form)
Panel A.  Expenditures (Male)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Total Total Total Shared Other Children Animal / Clothing Meals in Other Medical
Expend Shared Private Food Shared Construct Restaurants Private
Male Received Shock 0.157 -0.133 0.212 -0.020 -0.123 -0.004 0.007 0.062 0.035 0.103 0.049
(0.191) (0.145) (0.095)** (0.089) (0.093) (0.031) (0.038) (0.044) (0.027) (0.068) (0.040)
Female Received Shock -0.150 -0.095 -0.110 -0.012 -0.039 -0.014 -0.037 -0.005 -0.042 -0.081 0.058
(0.182) (0.150) (0.085) (0.087) (0.107) (0.029) (0.038) (0.038) (0.027) (0.060) (0.045)
F-test (for private items) - - 0.02** - - - - 0.27 0.04** 0.07* -
Panel B.  Expenditures (Female)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Total Total Total Shared Other Children Animal / Clothing Meals in Other Medical
Expend Shared Private Food Shared Construct Restaurants Private
Male Received Shock -0.030 -0.019 -0.039 -0.043 0.010 -0.024 0.038 0.016 -0.006 -0.025 0.014
(0.121) (0.083) (0.056) (0.064) (0.037) (0.024) (0.018)** (0.032) (0.008) (0.039) (0.034)
Female Received Shock 0.163 0.136 -0.022 0.061 0.037 0.032 0.006 -0.015 -0.002 -0.005 0.079
(0.153) (0.098) (0.064) (0.067) (0.057) (0.026) (0.013) (0.035) (0.010) (0.047) (0.041)*
F-test (for private items) - - 0.82 - - - - 0.46 0.79 0.67 -
Panel C.  Savings / Transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ROSCA Total Transfer to Transfers ROSCA Total Transfer to Transfers
Savings Savings Spouse Outside HH Savings Savings Spouse Outside HH
Male Received Shock -0.125 0.881 0.077 0.052 -0.126 0.167 -0.077 -0.025
(0.107) (0.387)** (0.065) (0.198) (0.079) (0.233) (0.065) (0.159)
Female Received Shock -0.107 0.141 -0.162 -0.137 0.096 0.574 0.162 0.086
(0.099) (0.310) (0.059)*** (0.150) (0.074) (0.239)** (0.059)*** (0.185)
Observations 900
Number of IDs 142
Notes: All regressions are estimated by fixed effects with controls for the week of the interview. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
All coefficients are divided by 150 shillings, the size of the experimental shock.  The main test of Pareto efficiency is Column 3 in Panels A and B, which shows the effect of
the shocks on private expenditures. In Panels A and B, 
The "total shared" category includes Columns 4 and 5: shared food (all food consumed jointly at home), and "other shared," which includes cleaning supplies, rent, water, other 
household bills, and other shared household items. The "total private" category includes Columns 8-10 (clothing and shoes, meals in restaurants, and other private), as well as 
other categories, including alcohol, soda, cigarettes, hairstyling, entertainment, newspapers, and transportation. Column 10 (other private) includes transportation, bicycle
expenditures, personal hygiene products, and other private items such as airtime for mobile phones. 
Total expenditures equal the sum of total shared, total private, items for children, medical, animals & construction, and charity.
The dependent variables in Panel C are individual savings and transfers for men (Columns 1-4) and women (Columns 5-8). Transfers are defined as positive for outflows and 
negative for inflows. Savings are defined as the sum of total income (including the experimental shocks), transfers, and bank and ROSCA flows minus total expenditures.
See Tables 4 and A1 for the effect of the shocks on labor supply.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The dependent variables in Panels A and B are individual expenditures by men and women, respectively.
Male Outcomes Female Outcomes
----- Aggregate Categories -----  ----------------------------------------- Specific Subcategories -----------------------------------------
----- Aggregate Categories -----  ----------------------------------------- Specific Subcategories -----------------------------------------
Table 4. Shocks on Household-Level Outcomes (Instrumental Variables)
Panel A. First Stage (1) (2)
Total Total 
Male Income Female Income
Male Received Shock 170.606 5.095
(54.591)*** (29.251)
Female Received Shock -21.918 147.738
(46.695) (28.017)***
Observations 900 900
Number of IDs 142 142
Panel B. IV Results (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Total Total Total Transfers
Expend Shared Private Savings Outside HH
Total Male Income 0.071 -0.171 0.163 0.936 0.022
(0.232) (0.191) (0.124) (0.290)*** (0.218)
Total Female Income -0.023 -0.017 -0.114 0.911 -0.045
(0.306) (0.254) (0.126) (0.371)** (0.277)
Chi-squared Test of Equality (p-value) 0.790 0.560 0.100 0.950 0.770
Observations 900 899 900 899 900
Number of IDs 142 142 142 142 142
Note:  Instruments in Panel B are the experimental payoffs.  All regressions estimated
by fixed effects with controls for the week of the interview. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Total income is the sum of labor income and the experimental shock, if it was received.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 5. Baseline Means Across Treatment Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 F-test for 
(corr=0.5) (corr=0) (corr=-0.5) Joint Equality Obs IDs
A.  Background Information
Occupation:
  Bike Taxi Driver 0.438 0.451 0.381 0.202 264 138
(0.031) (0.023) (0.032)
  Market Stall 0.169 0.143 0.226 0.424 264 138
(0.039) (0.038) (0.051)
  Housewife / no job 0.247 0.297 0.274 0.643 264 138
(0.038) (0.036) (0.041)
Luo Tribe 0.438 0.451 0.381 0.202 264 138
(0.031) (0.023) (0.032)
Religion
     Catholic 0.200 0.363 0.326 0.101 267 138
(0.051) (0.063) (0.068)
     Protestant 0.511 0.352 0.291 0.049** 267 138
(0.067) (0.060) (0.061)
Age 26.889 27.484 28.395 0.577 267 138
(0.937) (1.052) (1.087)
Education 7.368 7.310 7.494 0.878 255 138
(0.262) (0.244) (0.269)
Read Swahili 0.856 0.822 0.814 0.747 266 138
(0.037) (0.045) (0.047)
Write Swahili 0.789 0.800 0.791 0.982 266 138
(0.041) (0.046) (0.044)
# children 2.456 2.644 2.628 0.885 266 138
(0.304) (0.304) (0.267)
# dependents 3.264 3.554 3.304 0.828 249 133
(0.347) (0.374) (0.314)
B.  Access to Savings / Informal Credit 
Participates in ROSCA 0.551 0.562 0.494 0.674 263 138
(0.061) (0.054) (0.059)
Received gift or loan in last year 0.910 0.934 0.895 0.613 266 138
(0.033) (0.025) (0.031)
Amount received in gifts or loans 1777 2320 1890 0.298 267 138
     last year (229) (271) (324)
Gave gift or loan last year 0.798 0.899 0.840 0.158 259 138
(0.041) (0.034) (0.044)
Amount given in gifts or loans 1053 1442 1642 0.190 266 138
     last year (155) (244) (360)
Notes: Columns 1-3 present regression coefficients and standard errors (clustered by
household) from regressions of the dependent variable on indicators for the 3 experimental
Groups. All figures are self-reported.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 5. Baseline Means Across Treatment Groups (cont'd)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 F-test of
(corr=0.5) (corr=0) (corr=-0.5) Joint Equality Obs IDs
C.  Asset Ownership
Acres of land owned 0.467 0.434 0.526 0.882 267 138
(0.129) (0.118) (0.141)
Value of land owned 31171 19185 23675 0.627 243 136
(11852) (5284) (7131)
Value of Durable Goods Owned 1899 1503 1920 0.658 267 138
(448) (317) (433)
Value of Animals Owned 1582 2051 1002 0.740 267 138
(645) (1868) (594)
D.  Variables that might affect bargaining power
Can make financial decisions 0.778 0.789 0.741 0.660 265 138
     independently (0.040) (0.037) (0.039)
Can buy food independently 0.600 0.578 0.647 0.727 265 138
(0.062) (0.060) (0.064)
Days since last visit to town 99.8 25.7 39.6 0.548 261 137
(82.5) (12.0) (14.9)
Knows a friend or family member 0.438 0.538 0.523 0.395 266 138
     who is separated (0.055) (0.058) (0.058)
Knows a friend or family member 0.409 0.522 0.593 0.048** 264 138
     who is divorced (0.050) (0.052) (0.056)
Can stay with friend or relative if 0.811 0.857 0.779 0.385 267 138
     problem at home (0.044) (0.034) (0.048)
Perception of Stigma from Separation
     Not Negative at all 0.056 0.000 0.035 0.014** 266 138
(0.024) 0.000 (0.020)
     Somewhat Negative 0.169 0.143 0.128 0.769 266 138
(0.042) (0.040) (0.037)
     Very Negative 0.775 0.857 0.837 0.425 266 138
(0.049) (0.040) (0.046)
Perception of Stigma from Divorce
     Not Negative at all 0.045 0.000 0.035 0.026** 266 138
(0.022) 0.000 (0.020)
     Somewhat Negative 0.124 0.088 0.116 0.748 266 138
(0.032) (0.036) (0.037)
     Very Negative 0.831 0.912 0.849 0.301 266 138
(0.042) (0.036) (0.046)
Notes: Columns 1-3 present regression coefficients and standard errors (clustered by
household) from regressions of the dependent variable on indicators for the 3 experimental
Groups. All figures are self-reported.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 6. Testing for Limited Commitment with Experimental Shocks
Panel A. Female Transfers to Male (1)
Transfers to
Spouse
Female Received Payment * Group 1 -0.002
(0.113)
Female Received Payment * Group 2 0.235
(0.070)***
Female Received Payment * Group 3 0.269
(0.169)
Male Received Payment -0.054
(0.062)
F-test: Group 2 > Group 1 (p-value) 0.04**
F-test: Group 3 > Group 1 (p-value) 0.110
F-test: Group 3 > Group 2 (p-value) 0.430
Observations 900
IDs 142
Panel B. Male Transfers to Female (1)
Transfers to
Spouse
Male Received Payment * Group 1 0.121
(0.128)
Male Received Payment * Group 2 0.047
(0.095)
Male Received Payment * Group 3 0.059
(0.104)
Female Received Payment -0.167
(0.061)***
F-test: Group 2 > Group 1 (p-value) 0.320
F-test: Group 3 > Group 1 (p-value) 0.350
F-test: Group 3 > Group 2 (p-value) 0.470
Observations 900
IDs 142
Notes: All regressions are estimated by fixed effects with controls 
for the week of the interview. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 7. Testing for History Dependence
Dependent Variable: Female Transfers to Male (1) (2) (3)
Respondent Received Shock 20.038 26.941 35.158
(10.854)* (10.342)** (12.704)***
Spouse Received Shock -3.983 -15.122 -17.835
(11.798) (10.777) (11.383)
Sum of Own Shocks 7.528
(8.198)
Sum of Spouse's Shocks -11.994
(12.623)
Respondent Received Shock Previous Week 13.174
(11.654)
Spouse Received Shock Previous Week -8.471
(11.427)
Sum of Respondent Shocks Past 2 Weeks 19.759
(11.916)*
Sum of Spouse Shocks Past 2 Weeks -8.719
(9.474)
p-value for joint significance of history variables 0.552 0.494 0.210
Observations 900 751 607
Number of IDs 142 142 141
Notes: All regressions are estimated by fixed effects with controls for the week of the interview. 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 8. Risk Aversion and Altruism
Panel A. Risk Aversion (1) (2) (3)
50 Ksh 100 Ksh 150 Ksh
Investment Investment Investment
Female 20.310 44.651 73.566
(11.035) (21.796) (33.768)
Male 22.481 46.977 74.419
(11.042) (22.171) (34.344)
Difference 2.171 2.326 0.853
p-value for test Male = Female 0.116 0.396 0.841
Observations 258 258 258
Panel B. Altruism (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dictator Choice Dictator Choice Dictator Choice Dictator Choice Dictator Choice Dictator Choice
50 Ksh 100 Ksh 150 Ksh 50 Ksh 100 Ksh 150 Ksh
Female 20.591 39.252 55.709 20.984 40.512 54.764
(7.363) (16.221) (23.023) (8.093) (16.413) (22.607)
Male 24.570 46.992 67.891 25.250 47.617 70.977
(9.066) (16.438) (25.213) (8.430) (15.124) (24.624)
Difference 3.980 7.740 12.182 4.266 7.105 16.213
p-value for test Male = Female <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001***
Observations 255 255 255 255 255 255
Notes: Means are reported, with standard deviations in parentheses.
Investment in Panel A is the amount put into an investment that pays off 2.5 times the amount
invested with probability 0.5, and 0 with probability 0.5.
^The choices to an anonymous stranger were not actually paid out, whereas one of the responses for the amount given to
the spouse were. See text for details.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Amt. Given to Anonymous Stranger^ Amt. Given to Spouse
Table 9. Labor Income Fluctuations and Individual Level Outcomes
Panel A.  Expenditures (Male)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Total Total Total Shared Other Children Animal / Clothing Meals in Other Medical
Expend Shared Private Food Shared Construct Restaurants Private
Male Labor Income 0.174 0.116 0.049 0.040 0.077 0.003 -0.002 0.005 0.017 0.029 0.011
(0.034)*** (0.048)** (0.015)*** (0.016)** (0.043)* (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)*** (0.010)*** (0.017)
Female Labor Income 0.012 0.000 -0.012 -0.014 0.022 -0.001 -0.006 0.000 -0.003 -0.006 0.007
(0.027) (0.021) (0.009) (0.008)* (0.016) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.015)
F-test (for private items) - - <0.001*** - - - - 0.28 <0.001*** 0.01** -
Panel B.  Expenditures (Female)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Total Total Total Shared Other Children Animal / Clothing Meals in Other Medical
Expend Shared Private Food Shared Construct Restaurants Private
Male Labor Income 0.034 0.025 0.009 0.010 0.014 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.013)*** (0.009)*** (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)** (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)* (0.001) (0.005) (0.003)
Female Labor Income 0.126 0.093 0.027 0.055 0.028 0.009 0.000 0.016 0.001 0.006 0.006
(0.043)*** (0.039)** (0.009)*** (0.031)* (0.008)*** (0.006) (0.001) (0.005)*** (0.001) (0.007) (0.011)
F-test (for private items) - - 0.11 - - - - 0.17 0.65 0.43 -
Panel C.  Savings / Transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ROSCA Total Transfer to Transfers ROSCA Total Transfer to Transfers
Savings Savings Spouse Outside HH Savings Savings Spouse Outside HH
Male Labor Income -0.003 0.726 -0.005 0.092 -0.014 -0.019 0.005 -0.021
(0.015) (0.074)*** (0.009) (0.041)** (0.031) (0.021) (0.009) (0.013)
Female Labor Income 0.010 0.004 0.009 -0.024 -0.019 0.796 -0.009 0.087
(0.016) (0.028) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.048)*** (0.014) (0.022)***
F-test (ROSCA savings only) 0.50 - - - 0.87 - - -
Observations 914
Number of IDs 142
Notes: All regressions are estimated by fixed effects with controls for the week of the interview. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The dependent variables in Panels A and B are individual expenditures by men and women, respectively.
See Table 3 for description of categories.
Male Outcomes Female Outcomes
----- Aggregate Categories -----  ---------------------------------------------- Specific Subcategories ----------------------------------------------
----- Aggregate Categories -----  ---------------------------------------------- Specific Subcategories ----------------------------------------------
Table 10. Interactions Between Shocks and Background Characteristics
Panel A. Female Transfers to Male (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Male Received Shock -0.056 -0.051 -0.054 -0.049 -0.054 -0.052 -0.051
(0.061) (0.068) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
Female Received Shock 0.193 0.187 0.192 0.195 0.192 0.192 0.313
(0.075)** (0.084)** (0.075)** (0.075)*** (0.076)** (0.077)** (0.071)***
Female Received Shock * Acres of Land -0.037
    Owned by Female (0.030)
Female Received Shock * Value of Land -0.036
    Owned by Female (0.030)
Female Received Shock * Value of Animals -0.022
    Owned by Female (0.020)
Female Received Shock * Amount Saved -0.080
    in ROSCA in Past Year by Female (0.045)*
Female Received Shock * Amount Received -0.024
    in Gifts & Loans in Past Year by Female (0.048)
Female Received Shock * Amount Given -0.021
    in Gifts & Loans in Past Year by Female (0.066)
Female Received Shock * Female -0.223
    Can Make Independent Financial Decisions (0.141)
Observations 831 735 831 831 831 831 822
# of IDs 131 117 131 131 131 131 129
Panel B. Male Transfers to Female (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male Received Shock 0.029 0.034 0.033 0.040 0.033 0.035
(0.058) (0.063) (0.059) (0.060) (0.062) (0.060)
Female Received Shock -0.196 -0.194 -0.195 -0.194 -0.193 -0.185
(0.071)*** (0.077)** (0.072)*** (0.072)*** (0.073)*** (0.072)**
Male Received Shock * Acres of Land -0.101
    Owned by Male (0.043)**
Male Received Shock * Value of Land -0.051
    Owned by Male (0.040)
Male Received Shock * Value of Animals -0.049
    Owned by Male (0.052)
Male Received Shock * Amount Saved 0.065
    in ROSCA in Past Year by Male -0.065
Male Received Shock * Amount Received -0.005
    in Gifts & Loans in Past Year by Male (0.073)
Male Received Shock * Amount Given 0.106
    in Gifts & Loans in Past Year by Male (0.064)
Observations 869 801 869 869 869 861
# of IDs 136 126 136 136 136 135
Notes: All regressions are estimated by fixed effects with controls for the week of the interview. 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
All land, access to credit, and ROSCA savings measures are standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Appendix Table 1.  Effect of Experimental Shocks on Labor Supply
Panel A.  Male Labor Supply (1) (2)
Hours Labor
Worked Income
Male Received Payment 2.67 20.61
(2.480) (54.591)
Female Received Payment -5.49 -21.92
(5.274) (46.695)
F-test 0.53 0.77
Observations 900 900
# of IDs 142 142
Panel B.  Female Labor Supply (1) (2)
Hours Labor
Worked Income
Male Received Payment -4.56 -2.26
(3.031) (28.017)
Female Received Payment 1.46 5.10
(1.616) (29.251)
F-test 0.32 0.98
R-squared 900 900
142 142
Notes: All regressions are estimated by fixed effects with 
controls for the week of the interview.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Appendix Table 2. Limited Commitment, Expenditures, Savings, and Outside Transfers
Panel A. Female Expenditures and Savings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7)
Total Shared Private ROSCA Total Transfers
Expend Expend Expend Savings Savings Outside HH
Female Received Payment * Group 1 0.259 0.315 -0.111 0.048 0.355 0.268
(0.211) (0.136)** (0.095) (0.158) (0.446) (0.481)
Female Received Payment * Group 2 -0.041 -0.017 -0.031 0.108 0.714 -0.098
(0.328) (0.201) (0.139) (0.072) (0.388)* (0.211)
Female Received Payment * Group 3 0.292 0.106 0.095 0.137 0.665 0.089
(0.213) (0.185) (0.078) (0.099) (0.392)* (0.138)
Male Received Payment -0.025 -0.036 -0.021 -0.119 0.193 -0.039
(0.123) (0.086) (0.056) (0.076) (0.240) (0.138)
F-test: Group 1 = Group 2 (p-value) 0.430 0.150 0.640 0.730 0.540 0.510
F-test: Group 1 = Group 3 (p-value) 0.920 0.400 0.09* 0.600 0.610 0.700
F-test: Group 2 = Group 3 (p-value) 0.400 0.670 0.420 0.810 0.930 0.470
Observations 900 900 900 898 900 900
IDs 142 142 142 142 142 142
Panel B. Male Expenditures and Savings (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7)
Total Shared Private ROSCA Total Transfers
Expend Expend Expend Savings Savings Outside HH
Male Received Payment * Group 1 0.224 -0.193 0.308 -0.247 0.064 -0.038
(0.342) (0.273) (0.129)** (0.221) (0.752) (0.372)
Male Received Payment * Group 2 0.560 0.059 0.319 0.019 0.832 -0.109
(0.343) (0.233) (0.174)* (0.142) (0.425)* (0.293)
Male Received Payment * Group 3 -0.322 -0.259 -0.001 -0.140 1.820 0.312
(0.330) (0.258) (0.160) (0.143) (0.656)*** (0.392)
Female Received Payment -0.209 -0.105 -0.141 -0.100 0.305 -0.102
(0.187) (0.154) (0.084)* (0.105) (0.308) (0.166)
F-test: Group 1 = Group 2 (p-value) 0.490 0.500 0.960 0.290 0.370 0.880
F-test: Group 1 = Group 3 (p-value) 0.250 0.850 0.130 0.680 0.07* 0.530
F-test: Group 2 = Group 3 (p-value) 0.08* 0.390 0.170 0.420 0.220 0.400
Observations 900 899 900 895 900 900
IDs 142 142 142 142 142 142
Notes: All regressions are estimated by fixed effects with controls for the week of the interview. 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Appendix Table 3. Results for Couples with Similar Levels of Risk Aversion and Altruism
Panel A. Small Differences in Risk Aversion (1) (2)
Female Male
Transfer to Spouse Private Expenditures
Female Received Payment 0.234 0.027
(0.072)*** (0.102)
Male Received Payment -0.050 0.219
(0.075) (0.127)*
Observations 610 610
IDs 95 95
Panel B. Small Differences in Altruism (1) (2)
Female Male
Transfer to Spouse Private Expenditures
Female Received Payment 0.193 -0.119
(0.065)*** (0.120)
Male Received Payment -0.079 0.257
(0.080) (0.135)*
Observations 529 529
IDs 83 83
Notes: All regressions are estimated by fixed effects with controls for the week of the interview. 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Regressions in Panel A are run for couples with no greater than a 10 Ksh difference in the 
amount of 100 Ksh that they put into an investment which pays off 2.5 times the amount
invested with probability 0.5, and 0 with probability 0.5. Regressions in Panel B are run
for couples with no greater than a 10 Ksh difference in the amount of 100 Ksh 
that they allocated to their spouse in a dictator game.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Appendix Table 4. Transfers at Beginning and End of Experiment
Dependent Variable: Transfers from Wife to Husband
(1) (2)
Excluding Last 2 Weeks Last 2 Weeks
of Experiment of Experiment Only
Female Received Payment * Group 1 0.100 -0.046
(0.125) (0.217)
Female Received Payment * Group 2 0.270 0.072
(0.089)*** (0.109)
Female Received Payment * Group 3 0.164 0.113
(0.119) (0.216)
Male Received Payment -0.052 -0.115
(0.079) (0.090)
Observations 616 284
IDs 142 142
Notes: All regressions are estimated by fixed effects with controls for the week
of the interview. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
